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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOHN LEGG, JR.,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000428-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence entered on a guilty plea to Attempted Receiving
or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
41-la-1316(2) (1999), 76-4-101 (1999), and 76-4-102(3) (1999); Burglary of a Building,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999); and Aggravated
Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(c) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three
consecutive indeterminate prison terms of zero-to-five years, where it considered all
legally relevant factors, including the gravity of the crime, his twelve-year criminal
history, his extended drug addiction, and his proven inability to conform himself to
societal norms?
Standard of Review: "The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law."' State v. Schweitzer,
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate
court] review[s] the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id.
(citing State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). An appellate court may
find an abuse of discretion "only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take
the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with receiving or transferring a stolen
motor vehicle, burglary, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, aggravated
assault, failure to respond to officer's signal to stop, third degree felonies; and criminal
mischief, theft, and interference with a peace officer making an arrest, class B
misdemeanors. R. 2-5.
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on all counts
but burglary and theft. R. 20-23. Defendant asked for a second preliminary hearing
which the trial court granted. R. 30-34. At the second preliminary hearing, the burglary
charge was amended to burglary of a building, and defendant was bound over on all
charges. R. 45-46. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover, which included a
transcript of the second preliminary hearing. R. 52-114. Evidence presented at the
second preliminary hearing detailed the gravity and circumstances of the charged
offenses. See generally R. 68-114.
Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant pleaded guilty to the following three
reduced charges: one count of attempted receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle,
one count of burglary of a building, and aggravated assault, all third degree felonies.
Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive statutory, indeterminate terms of
zero-to-five years. R. 137-38; 158:8-9. Defendant timely appeals his sentence. R.14243.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Crimes
On the afternoon of May, 21, 1999, Officer Mike Hamideh was working off-duty,
in uniform, as a security guard at Rocky Mountain Raceway when he noticed a red 1995
Lexus enter the parking lot. R. 4, 86. The car had a red emergency light on its top,
similar to those used on unmarked police cars. Id. As the car entered the main gate,
Officer Hamideh noticed that it was profusely leaking oil onto the staging lane. R. 87.
He immediately recognized the oil as a danger to the racing cars, and that the red light
was for use only on emergency vehicles. R. 4, 86-88. He approached the car to inform
the driver of his concerns. R. 89.
As he approached the car, Officer Hamideh recognized defendant as the driver. R.
88. He remembered defendant from a previous police encounter two days earlier. Id.
The car bore a Lowbook Sales advertisement plate, and no valid license plates or other
registration. R. 89. Officer Hamideh suspected the car was stolen. R. 89-90.
Through the open driver's side window, Officer Hamideh asked defendant who
owned the car. Id. Defendant answered that his parents leased it for him through their
business. R. 90. Upon Officer Hamideh's request to see the registration, defendant
produced a green sheet of paper. Id. The paper appeared to be a lease agreementfroman
individual named Pearlstine out of Phoenix, Arizona. Id. A check on the vehicle
identification number revealed that the car was not registered in either Arizona or Utah.

4

R. 91.
Officer Hamideh asked defendant to turn off the vehicle. Id. Defendant ignored
Officer Hamideh's request, staring straight ahead. Id. Defendant began moving the car,
turning it around to face a nearby crowd of between sixty to eighty spectators. R. 92-93,
96. Officer Hamideh followed along the driver's side, ordering defendant to turn off the
car. Id. In response, defendant locked the driver's door and began to roll up the window.
R. 93. Officer Hamideh blocked the window and again ordered defendant to turn off the
car. Id. Defendant asked to exit the car, but was told to remain and turn off the engine.
Id. Without turning off the car, defendant rolled the window down. Id. Officer Hamideh
called for back up. Id.
Defendant then pushed the gas pedal to the floor, loudly revving the engine. R.
93-94. Fearing for the safety of the crowd directly in front of the car, Officer Hamideh
lunged inside the open driver's side window, and attempted to turn off the ignition
switch. R. 93,106. With Officer Hamideh hanging from the car, defendant slapped the
gear shift into drive, causing the tires to spin. R. 93-94. As the car accelerated, Officer
Hamideh instinctively held on to defendant's head to keep from slipping under the rear
tires. R. 94-95, 106. Defendant aimed the car toward a large cement barrier, attempting
to swipe Officer Hamideh from the side of the car. R. 94. Before the car reached the
barrier, Officer Hamideh managed to push himself free. R. 95. He rolled away from the
car, as defendant raced off toward the pit area and almost hitt a security guard. R. 95, 108.
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Officer Hamideh suffered scrapes on his calves and right hand. R.95.
Shortly thereafter, the car was found abandoned next to Lindsay and Sheryl
Strasburg's motor home. R. 95-96. Ms. Strasburg entered her motor home and spotted
defendant lying on the floor, wearing her husband's shirt. R. 71-72. Defendant begged
her not to reveal him to police. R. 72. Ms. Strasburg left her motor home and informed
her husband that defendant was inside. R. 73. Mr. Strasburg opened the door and saw
defendant still lying on the floor. R. 80-81. Defendant ordered Mr. Strasburg to let him
leave, and then ran out. R. 81. Officer Hamideh spotted defendant and, after a brief
struggle, took him into custody. R. 98. A visual search of the car revealed drugs. R. 9697. The car was later found to have been stolen from Low Book Auto Sales. R. 99.
Sentencing
Prior to sentencing the court ordered, received, and reviewed defendant's PSI. R.
158:2. The PSI contains defendant's twelve-year adult criminal history, and discusses, in
detail, defendant's character, mental health and drug history. R. 157:7-10, 12-17.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced as an adult for business burglary, aggravated
assault, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief theft, criminal mischief aggravated assault,
trespassing, theft, violating probation, burglary, assault, theft by receiving, criminal
trespass, aggravated burglary, domestic assault, violating a protective order, escape from
custody, criminal mischief, receiving a stolen vehicle, and failure to respond to an
officer's signal. R. 157:7-10. Several of those offenses were repeat convictions
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including aggravated offenses, burglary, assault, theft, and criminal mischief. Id. The
PSI also extensively examined defendant's probation and parole history, revealing that
defendant violated probation on three occasions. R. 157:7-8, 11-12. In prison, defendant
was disciplined by the Prison Disciplinary Board eighteen times for offenses including
inciting disorder and dealing contraband (disciplined three times). R. 157:7-10. While
awaiting sentencing for the present offense, defendant was disciplined twice for
destroying jail property and was sentenced to one year of probation for assaulting a
prisoner. R. 157:10. Defendant has a twenty-one year history of drug use, including daily
use of marijuana and methamphetamine. R. 157:15. While confined in prison, defendant
has used and sold drugs. R. 157:9. Defendant was using methamphetamine when he
committed the present offense. R. 157:4, 15; 96-97.
At sentencing, defendant recognized that he would receive a prison sentence, but
requested that he be allowed to participate in drug therapy program and that his sentences
run concurrently. R. 158:5-6. The court listened to statements by defense counsel and
defendant, pertaining to defendant's character and criminal history. R. 158:3-7. Then,
faced with defendant's lengthy criminal history and the gravity of his crimes, the court
imposed its sentencing order:
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you serve the term
provided by law in the Utah State Prison of zero to five years for each of the
three separate Third Degree Felony crimes to which you pled guilty.
Mr. Legg, had it been something other than the serious risk that you
placed on the officer who was seeking to do his duty here, which could
have resulted in his death rather easily, quite frankly; had it been something
7

other than that - and I don't ascribe to you a malevolent intent to do harm to
this specific officer. But the nature of the conduct was such that it was
absolutely and totally out of control, Mr. Legg. And the mere fact that the
officer survived this with injuries no greater than he received was
fortuitous. It had nothing to do with your conduct.
That sort of conduct, Mr. Legg, whether you are grieving for the loss
of a son or strung out on drugs, is absolutely unacceptable. And you
understand that, of course. So, the consequence of all of it is that you must
now pay your debt.
It is my order that you serve the terms consecutively and not
concurrently, Mr. Legg.
I will recommend that while you are at the Utah State Prison you
receive substance abuse therapy to the extent that you are able to get it. I
hope that it does you some good.
Good luck to you.
R. 158:8-9. A copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in Addendum B.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
consecutive prison terms without considering all legally relevant factors. The record
demonstrates otherwise. The sentencing court was presented with mitigating and
aggravating information from the PSI, the testimony given in defendant's preliminary
hearing, and statements made by defense counsel and defendant at sentencing. Thus, it is
clear from the record that the sentencing judge duly considered the gravity and
circumstances of the offense, together with the history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of defendant
Imposing consecutive sentences, was not an abuse of discretion in view of the fact
that defendant nearly seriously injured a police officer, and because of his long-standing
8

drug addition, twelve-year criminal history, and proven inability to conform himself to
societal norms.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL LEGALLY
RELEVANT FACTORS IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
PRISON TERMS, THEREFORE, IT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION
Defendant claims that the sentencing court did not adequately consider statutorily
prescribed factors relevant to consecutive sentencing under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401
(1999). Br. of Aplt. at 10. The record refutes defendant's claim.
A.

A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing.
"The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the discretion of the [trial]

court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate court] review[s] the
sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id. (citing State v. Houk,
906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). "To do otherwise would have a chilling effect
on the trial court which has the main responsibility for sentencing." State v. Gerrard, 584
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); accord Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.
As stated, when a defendant has pleaded guilty to multiple felony offenses, the trial
court may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1).
In determining whether or not to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must
9

"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (4).1 A trial court
does not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences unless it fails to consider
the statutory factors or if the sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair or clearly
excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. Moreover, "[an appellate court] may find an
abuse of discretion only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887).
Section 76-3-401(4) requires only that the court consider the factors noted above,
not that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see also State v.
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (Although a sentencing judge will give
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other
factors.); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than
rehabilitating him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily

l

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1999), provides:

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
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reflects the personal judgment of the court/' which endeavors to impose "a proper
sentence based on the facts and law before it." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
B-

The trial court properly considered all legally relevant sentencing factors.
Defendant argues that the trial court did not consider the statutory factors under

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) because it did not specifically mention each factor in
pronouncing sentence. Br. of Aplt. at 13. The trial court, however, was not required to
specifically mention each statutory factor in imposing sentence. Rather, when the record
shows that the trial court had before it information regarding the requisite factors, it is
assumed that the those factors were considered. See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651-52.
In Schweitzer this Court held that a sentencing court properly considered the
factors listed in section 76-3-401(4), where evidence of those factors was presented to the
court through defense counsel's arguments, defendant's statements, the PSI, and other
record evidence.2 Id. at 652. Schweitzer argued, as defendant does here, that the trial
abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive indeterminate prison terms because
it did not mention the statutory factors in pronouncing sentence and therefore, necessarily
did not consider those factors. Id. at 651-52. This Court rejected that argument on the
ground that the information before the trial court clearly outlined and described

2

When Schweitzer was decided, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) was
codified as Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) (Supp. 1996). Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.
The 1997 amendment merely renamed 76-3-401(3) as 76-3-401(4). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-401(4) (1999). No significant differences between the former and present
subsections of the statute exist. Id.
11

defendant's history, character and rehabilitative needs as well as the gravity and
circumstances of his offenses. Id. The record also contained mitigating information
favoring Schweitzer's requests for rehabilitation. Id. This Court held that because all this
information was before the trial court, it appropriately considered all legally relevant
factors in sentencing Schweitzer to consecutive indeterminate prison terms.3 Id. at 65253.
In the present case, as in Schweitzer, all mitigating information was presented to
the trial court through the preliminary hearing, the PSI, defense counsel's arguments at
sentencing, and defendant's own statement at sentencing. Indeed, defendant concedes
that these sources presented "all mitigating information" to the trial judge. Br. of Aplt. at
13-14, note 1.
Testimonial evidence was put before the trial court through the preliminary hearing
transcript included as an addendum to defendant's motion to quash the bindover. R. 52114. The sentencing judge reviewed that motion and the accompanying preliminary
hearing transcript. Id. That transcript contains the testimony of Officer Hamideh and the
other victims, detailing the gravity and circumstances of defendant's offenses. R. 68-114.

3

Defendant attempts to distinguish Schweitzer by offering slight factual differences
between that and this case. Br. of Aplt. at 13-14, note 1. Although there are some
insignificant factual differences between the two cases, the rule of law set forth in
Schweitzer for indeterminate consecutive sentencing, precisely and correctly counters
defendant's arguments. Compare Br. of Aplt at 10-14 with Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 65153.
12

Officer Hamideh expressed his fear that defendant was intentionally driving toward a
cement barrier, attempting to crush him between the car and the barrier. R. 94; 157:5.
After barely escaping serious injury, Officer Hamideh saw defendant nearly hit a security
guard as the car sped off. R. 95. Defendant's apparent loss of control also endangered a
crowd of between sixty to eighty spectators. R. 92-93, 96.
The PSI also provided detailed information regarding the gravity and
circumstances of defendant's offenses, as well as his history, character, and rehabilitative
needs. See generally R. 157. The PSI reveals that defendant's lengthy criminal history
includes 41 separate offenses spaning twelve years, including such felonies as aggravated
assault on a police officer, business burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault,
theft, receiving a stolen vehicle, failure to respond to an officer's signal and criminal
mischief. R. 157:7-10. That history shows that defendant is a repeat offender for his
present crimes. Id. He has also been disciplined by the Prison Disciplinary Board
eighteen times. R. 157: 7-10. While awaiting sentencing for the present offense,
defendant was disciplined twice for destroying jail property and sentenced to one year of
probation for assaulting a prisoner. R. 157:10. The PSI also includes statements from the
victims and notes defendant's drug addiction and his request for rehabilitation. R. 157:15.
At sentencing, the trial judge listened as defense counsel presented the court with
mitigating information in requesting a drug treatment program and concurrent sentencing.
R. 158:3-7. Defense counsel's argument detailed defendant's criminal history, character
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and rehabilitative needs, and highlighted the circumstances of defendant's offenses. Id.
Additionally, defendant gave a statement in which he presented the court with similar
mitigating circumstances. R. 158:8.
Because, as defendant concedes, information detailing all legally relevant factors
was before the trial court, the court appropriately considered all the evidence in
sentencing defendant to consecutive indeterminate prison terms. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at
652-53. Moreover, in view of defendant's lengthy criminal record and the gravity of his
crimes, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the
trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing consecutive prison terms.4

'Defendant compares the instant case to State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998).
Br. of Aplt. at 8-12. Defendant offers Galli for the proposition that a trial court must give
"adequate weight" to the mitigating factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4).
Br. of Aplt. at 8, 11-12. Galli is inapposite. First, Galli's sentence differs radically from
defendant's. Galli was sentenced to three consecutive indeterminate terms of five years to
life. Galli, P.2d at 932-33. Therefore, Galli's minimum prison sentence was fifteen years.
Here, defendant was sentenced to three terms of zero-to-five years, therefore his
minimum sentence is still zero. R. 137-38; 158:8-9. Thus, defendant's indeterminate
sentence cannot be properly compared to Galli's sentence. Second, Galli had virtually no
prior criminal history, whereas defendant's criminal history spans twelve years. Galli,
967 P.2d at 938. R. 157:7-10. Third, Galli had shown that he was a potentially good
candidate for rehabilitation. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Defendant's history, including his
recidivism and misbehavior in prison, shows that he is a poor candidate for rehabilitation.
R. 157:7-10.
Defendant also cites State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), and State v.
Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) to support his argument. Br., of Aplt. at 10. But "both
those cases involved consecutive sentences for serious offenses in which the defendants
were sentenced to serve a minimum of twenty-four and sixty years, respectively, before
being eligible for parole, due to minimum-mandatory sentence requirements. Both the
14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's consecutive sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^&^y

of January, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

\ COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General

Strunk and Smith courts reversed those sentences, reasoning that the imposition of
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences infringed upon the Board of Pardon's duties
to monitor a defendant's progress and abrogated the board's flexibility to parole a
defendant earlier." State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(distinguishing Strunk and Smith). See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02; Smith, 909 P.2d at
244-45. Here, as stated, defendant's minimum sentence is zero; therefore the Board of
Pardons has completefreedomto parole him whenever it deems appropriate.
Accordingly, both Strunk and Smith are inapposite to the instant case.
15
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-3-401

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently.
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-401

(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(10) This section may n6t be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned* means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; subdivided Subsection (6), added Subsection
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, (6Xb)(ii), and made related changes; substich. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275, tuted "of the defendant's initial sentence" for "of
§ 1.
sentence for any one or more of them" in SubAmendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- section (7 Kb); added "and the conduct giving
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection rise to the present offense did not occur after
(2) and redesignated the following subsections his initial sentencing by any other court" at the
accordingly.
end of Subsection (7)(c); added "When the limiThe 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, tation of Subsection (6)(a) applies" at the beginadded Subsections (3) and (12), redesignating n i n g of Subsection (8); and made stylistic
the other subsections accordingly, and made changes.
stylistic changes.
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Case No. 991910690FS

-vsJOHN LEGG, J R . ,

SENTENCING, 4-14-00

Defendant.

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of April, 2000,

12

this cause came on for hearing before the HONORABLE J. DENNIS

13

FREDERICK, District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake

14

County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

15
16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For t h e S t a t e :

JOHN JOHNSON
Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant:

DAVID V. FINLAYSON
Deputy Legal Defender

18
19
20
21
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From video by:

BILLIE WAY, CCT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE STATE OF UTAH,

3
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor, I do have a few brief
4 comments. You know, I was not provided with any sort of
5 documentation on Mr. Leggs' juvenile history and neither was

)

)

5

Plaintiff,

)

)

6
-vs-

) Case No.

7

9

THE COURT: Before I do so, do you wish to say anything on
2 behalf of Mr. Legg?

** *

1 3

8

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

4

6 the Court. And I would ask that any references to his juvenile
7 history on his Matrix be stricken. I've talked with Mr. Legg.

991910690FS

)
JOHN LEGG, J R . ,

) SENTENCING,

Defendant.

4-14-00

))

8 As Your Honor knows, those juvenile rap sheets have numerous

)

9 incidents on them, and some of them are simply coming back to

10
11

Page!

Page 1

1 1

BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h e 1 4 t h day of A p r i l ,

12

t h i s c a u s e came on f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e

13

FREDERICK, D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i t h o u t a j u r y i n t h e S a l t

14

County C o u r t h o u s e , S a l t Lake C i t y ,

t h e HONORABLE J .

2000,

DENNIS

10 see the judge again. Mr. Legg does not remember having that
11 significant of a juvenile history, and we weren't provided with
12 that. I would ask that those be stricken.

Lake

13

Utah.

THE COURT: Yeah, my dealing here with Mr. Legg is going

14 to be based on his conduct as an adult.

15

15

MR. FINLAYSON: okay. Thank you.

16

THE COURT: All right.

18

17

MR. FttJLAYSON: Then on his adult record, Judge, there's a

19

18 few corrections that we need to make: On the first page, it's

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For t h e S t a t e :

For t h e D e f e n d a n t :

JOHN JOHNSON
Deputy D i s t r i c t

Attorney

DAVID V. FINLAYSON
Deputy L e g a l D e f e n d e r

19 - oh, actually, mine is a faxed page. I don't know —

20

20
21
22
23
24
25

21
22

From v i d e o b y :

BILLIE WAY, CCT

23
24
25

THE COURT: Page 7?
MR. FiNfLAYSON: page 7. He does have - he only has one
prior felony. It's this business burglary that he was sent to
prison on. That's the only prior felony that Mr. Legg has in
his history. This Aggravated Assault that's shown here in '87
was a Class A Misdemeanor. That's why it is the one year out

Page 2
1
PROCEEDINGS
2
MR. FINLAYSON: And I also have John Legg. That's number
3 23,1 think.
4
THE COURT: okay, 23 on the calendar, State of Utah v.
5 John Legg, Jr.; Case No. CR99-690. Mr. Finlayson appearing on
6 behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott-7
MR. JOHNSON: This is my case Judge. John K. Johnson.
THE COURT: Allright,Mr. Johnson.
8
Are you John Legg, Jr.?
9
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, SIT.
10

111

THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, here is your lawyer; is that

12 correct?
113
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
14
THE COURT: This matter is on the calendar for
15 sentencing. The Defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 4th
16

of February of this year to the Third Degree Felony charge of

17
18
19
20
21
122
23
24
25

Attempted Receipt of a - or Transfer of Stolen Vehicle; Third
Degree Felony burglary and Third Degree Aggravated Assault.
The Court - this Court then ordered and has now received
and reviewed the Presentence Report in this matter.
Mr. Finlayson, you've seen that report; have you not?
MR. FINLAYSON: Y e s , Y o u r H o n o r .

THE COURT: is there any legal reason known to you why I
should not impose sentence at this time.
MR. FINLAYSON: No, there is not.

Page 4
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3
4
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to the (inaudible) prison. And so that is not a Felony.
And he only had one other felony, Fleeing conviction which
was reversed on appeal some time later. He did spend two years
in prison on that case before it was reversed, but it was
reversed on appeal and dismissed. And so that is the only
felony he has.
Any - and what they ~ they also have on Page 8 down
under "6-14 of '95," they have got an "Aggravated Burglary."
That case was disposed of. It was a Domestic Assault. It was
his - Mr. Legg's own house, and so it was disposed of as a
Domestic Assault. And he does not have an Aggravated Burglary
charge, either.
So, a number of these incidents on his adult history are
warrants that have come back up, and I just wanted to make sure
the Court was clear on what his adult history rerlly is. He
has one prior felony that he went to prison on. He went to
prison on another felony that was reversed on appeal, Felony
Fleeing, and that's it.
That brings us to this case, Judge. I -- now, Mr. Legg
has been my client for about a year now. It took about a year
for this case to go through because the court, one of the Judge Quinn's court had a technical problem with the
preliminary hearing, so we had to go back for the preliminary
hearing. It's taken quite quite awhile to resolve, and
Mr. Legg has been in jail the whole time.

STATE V. JOHN LEGG, JR.

uonoenscu
Page 7

Page 5
1

Mr. Legg admits that he has a significant drug problem,

1 of the nature of this case, because of his spending a year in

2 and his history shows that as well. He's never had a program, 2 jail so far on it, because the circumstances all arose out of
3 this very brief meeting with the officer, that you would impose
3 Judge. Never in - in his history, has he had a program that
4
these sentences concurrent. And we'll submit it, Your Honor.
4 has addressed his drug problem. And, obviously, you know,
5

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Finlayson.

6 does not address - really address that problem, either. They

6

Mr. Legg, before I decide what to do here, do you have

7 basically put you out there, and then you they might give you

7 anything to say?

5 going to prison on his first felony back in ' 88, the prison

8 some aspirin-type therapy before you are released back on the

8

9 street. But he's had a significant drug problem for a long

9 incident occurred, I had lost a baby boy. The (Inaudible).

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I'd like to add that before this

10 time. He recognized that. And I - as I've represented

10 And I've been out of prison for quite a long time. I served a

11 Mr. Legg, he - he was difficult to deal with to begin with.

11 five-year sentence, a zero to five. I've never been on parole.

12 And he's had a year in jail to think about what his history has 12 And I kind of just fell off my wagon and got strung out on
13 been, to think about what happened in this incident, having

113 drugs. And I don't even know why I stopped at the Bonneville

14 drugs in his system and creating a situation where this officer 14 Raceways or did anything that I did. I just - 1 was - we
15 could have been hurt or somebody else could have been hurt.

15 haven't had a boy in my family for (Inaudible) years. And

16

THE COURT: Or killed.

16 there was a boy, and he died at eight months' old. And it just

17

MR. FINLAYSON: Or killed by taking off from the officer.

17 - it just killed me. And after that - all I got to say is:

18

THE COURT: Yes.

18 I - I've been out there trying to prove myself as a

19

MR. FINLAYSON: He certainly never intended to hurt

19 responsible citizen after doing all of that time in prison.

20 anybody in that situation, and, luckily, the officer wasn't

20 And this incident occurred, I lost my mind. I wasn't in my

21 injured badly. You know, the -- the facts were pretty clear

121 ordinary state of mind when this occurred. And like

22 that he was taking off as the officer grabbed him and kind of

22 Mr. Finlayson said, I didn't mean to hurt nobody. It was just
23 hung onto the car. And I don't think - and it was based on a 23 a matter of circumstances that took place at the time.
24 recklessness situation, and he understands that.
25

24

But he is - from the time that I've represented him, Your ! 25

J

That's all I have to (Inaudible).
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Legg.

Page

Page 8

1 Honor, he's completely broken as a person. He does not have an

1

2 attitude towards the system anymore. He does not have an

2 inquire: Arc there any victims or victim representatives that

3 attitude towards authority that he did when I first met him.

3 wish to be heard?

4 And he has a markedly different outlook on where he wants to go

4

MR. JOHNSON: There are not

5 from here. And I say that, Your Honor, because - not because

5

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Johnson.

6

MR. JOHNSON: Judge, normally I would submit this on a

16

Mr. - Mr. Legg is asking you for probation. He understands

Mr. Johnson, what's the State's position - let me first

7 that be has very little chance at probation based on his

I 7 presentence repeat, but I think in this circumstance I'd like

8 history. He knows that he's going out to the prison. But I

8 to speak and strongly urge the Court for incarceration, that be
| 9 for a very long time. Under of the guise of methamphetamine,

9 think he is somebody who - his three felony convictions on
10 this case all arose out of this same incident in a very short

110 Mr. Legg became a one-man crime spree. And there were a lot of

11 period of time, and one of them arose out of him simply trying

111 people that were injured as a result of what he did, by his

12 to escape from the police officers and going into this motor

J12 actions.

13 home and taking somebody's shirt, and that was the burglary of

13

And in looking at this version of the incident, there's no

14 the building.

114 responsibility; none whatsoever. And had this not happened,

15

115 Judge, I think this would be an excellent script for a Keystone

We would ask, Your Honor, because of the nature of this

16 case and because Mr. Legg does not have a significant history,
117 as it seems in his report, that you would consider concurrent

16 Comedy. I mean, it's slapstick all the way. But the fact is
17 it did occur. I think anything short of a long prison term for

18 sentences on his - on these three different felony charges.

18 Mr. Legg will allow him to come back into the community and

19 He has - his Matrix - the point system - they've got - they

19 reoffend

120 - o n his Criminal History Assessment at the end of the - of

20

We'd submit it on that

21 the Criminal - of his Presentence Report, it should be 12

21

THE COURT: very well, Mr. Johnson.

22 points without - without dealing with the juvenile history, it

22

There being no legal reason why I should not impose

23 should be 12 points. He should be in a Category 4 instead of a
24 Category 5. He's going to spend a significant time in prison
li« oimarfv hist on one underlying offense. And we'd ask because

23 sentence, I shall should do so at this time, Mr. Legg.
24
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you
25 serve the term provided by law in the Utah State Prison of zero
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Page 9
to five years for each of the three separate Third Degree
Felony crimes to which you pled guilty.
Mr. Legg, had it been something other than the serious
risk that you placed on the officer who was seeking to do his
duty here, which could have resulted in his death rather
easily, quite frankly; had it been something other than that and I don't ascribe to you a malevolent intent to do harm to
this specific officer. But the nature of the conduct was such
that it was absolutely and totally out of control, Mr. Legg.
And the mere fact that the officer survived this with injuries
no greater than he received was fortuitous. It had nothing to
do with your conduct.
That sort of conduct, Mr. Legg, whether you are grieving
for the loss of a son or strung out on drugs, is absolutely
unacceptable. And you understand that, of course. So, the
consequence of all of it is that you must now pay your debt.
It is my order that you serve the terms consecutively and
not concurrently, Mr. Legg.
I will order that you payrestitutionin the amount of
$ 1,500 that was incurred by the victims of your crimes here.
I will, as I am bound to do, give you credit for the 314
days that you've now served in custody towards the ultimate
service in these matters.
I willrecommendthat while you are at the Utah State
Prison you receive substance abuse therapy to the extent that

Page 10
1 you are able to get it. I hope that it does you some good.
2
Good luck to you.
3
(Hearing adjourned.)
4
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